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Summary: Multinational entities are shifting their profits 
from jurisdictions with high tax rates to low tax 
jurisdictions that result in sovereign governments losing 
millions of dollars and euros. Profits are moved away from 
the jurisdictions in which the economic activity occurs and 
sovereign governments face difficulties in exercising their 
right to taxation. The most common method employed for 
artificially (but legally) shifting profits is the transfer of 
intangibles (intellectual property). This article will discuss 
this legal tax avoidance in the European Union by 
multinational entities using that common technique: 
shifting of goods and services between affiliates (transfer 
pricing). Companies are getting more self-confident in 
doing this because of the advanced tax rulings issued by 
national tax authorities, especially of particular member 
states of the European Union, that provide legal certainty 
for their corporate structures. This article will introduce to 
the U.S. readers (potentially) “harmful” tax practice 
exercised in the European Union by one of the world’s 
largest multinational companies. It will examine the rules 
of the European Union on state aid (Art. 107 and 108 of 
TFEU) and the European Commission’s investigation and 
their effect on such practice that is allegedly breaching the 
internal market of the EU. The discussion will then move 
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on to comparison of “harmful” tax practices in the United 
States.  Measures that international community, especially 
OECD, is implementing to fight tax avoidance will also be 
considered followed by June 2015 European Commission’s 
Action Plan on Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in 
the EU and its January 2016 proposal for Anti-Tax-
Avoidance Directive. This article provides U.S. readers a 





The businesses of big multinational entities, especially those from 
the United States, have been attracted to particular member states of the 
European Union (the “European Union” or the “EU”) because of their 
favorable legal and tax systems. The main goal of such multinationals is to 
concentrate their businesses in such an environment that potentiates 
maximization of profit while keeping their costs as low as possible.  
Historically, one would imagine such an attractive place as an 
offshore tax haven jurisdiction, typically an island. Its characteristics 
commonly include low or non-existent tax rates on certain types of 
income, no requirement of substantial business activity, lack of 
transparency and information sharing, and ease of entry in terms of 
incorporation of companies.  It is also typical for tax havens that there are 
2
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bank secrecy rules in place and there are little or no enforcement rules 
applicable on the side of the tax authorities, which do not (or hardly) have 
access to tax havens.
1
  
It seems that places like Cayman Islands, Isle of Man, Jersey, and 
the British Virgin Islands have lost their attractiveness to countries (such 
as Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Ireland) where the rule of law and 
the predictability of the legal system is considered to be the highest 
constitutional principle. Additionally, many consulting firms employ 
hundreds of highly educated tax lawyers and accountants who specialize 
in providing expensive and valuable tax advice and the most cost-effective 
solutions for multi-jurisdictional business operations to achieve low to 
zero tax rate on certain types of income. A very important characteristic of 
such jurisdictions is a possibility of advanced tax rulings, which can be 
described as comfort letters by tax authorities giving specific company 
clarity on how its corporate tax will be calculated or on the use of special 
tax provisions.
2
 Governments lose income tax revenue caused by the 
                                                 
1
 See generally Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV (2015). 
2
 Press Release, European Commission, State Aid: Commission Investigates Transfer 
Pricing Arrangements on Corporate Taxation of Apple (Ireland) Starbucks (Netherlands) 
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shifting of profits into low tax countries. It is hard to estimate exact budget 
losses, but some have identified annual losses of around $100 billion per 
year caused by such shifting.
3
 It is also worth noting that the term tax 
avoidance is considered to mean a legal reduction in taxes, as opposed to 
illegal tax evasion.
4
 This paper deals with legal tax avoidance by 
multinational entities in the European Union using one of the most 
common techniques for that purpose: shifting of goods and services 
between affiliates (transfer pricing). 
The big wave of investigations in the area of “harmful” tax 
practices within the European Union has started with the revelations of 
more than 28,000 pages of leaked documents by the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists.
5
 The journalists have identified 
more than three hundred multinational companies that shifted their profits 
to countries such as Luxembourg in order to save on due taxes. Alleged 
savings have been enormous, and resulted in lowering effective tax rates 
to little as 1%. 
                                                                                                                         
and Fiat Finance and Trade (Luxembourg) (June 14, 2014) . 
3




 Stephanie Bodoni, LuxLeaks a ‘Game Changer’ for EU In Tax-Deal Probes, Gramegna 
Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Dec. 22, 2014.  
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The recommendations within the EU on how to combat harmful 
tax practices go back to early 1990s. The Ruding Report of 1992 was one 
of the first documents to present that the differences between member 
states` corporate tax regimes cause significant distortions in the internal 
market as they influence choices of companies‘location and investments, 
and suggested that these practices be eliminated through harmonization of 
tax bases and approximating tax rates between member states.
6
  
The efforts of the EU in this field continued by the adoption of the 
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation (which concerns non-introduction 
of new and re-examination of existing tax measures described as harmful) 
and the Commission notice on the application of the state aid rules to 
measures relating to direct business taxation, both in 1998.
7
 The 
Communication on promoting good governance in tax matters from 2009 
is a continuation of the European Commission`s work in this field. 
Following media reports alleging that some multinational 
companies in the European Union have received significant tax reductions 
by way of tax rulings issued by national tax authorities, the European 
                                                 
6
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Commission has decided to open formal investigations under the EU state 
aid rules.
8
 In a June 11, 2014 press release, three in-depth investigations 
have been opened to examine whether decisions by tax authorities in 
Ireland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, with regard to the corporate 
income tax to be paid by Apple, Starbucks, and Fiat Finance and Trade, 
respectively, comply with the EU rules on state aid.
9
 The Starbucks and 
Fiat investigations, with respect to their tax positions in the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg, respectively, have been finalized by the European 
Commission with an unfavorable result for both companies. The 
Commission has ordered the Netherlands and Luxembourg to collect 
approximately $30,000,000 in taxes from Starbucks and Fiat. This paper 
deals with an additional investigation that has been opened with regard to 
a tax ruling issued to Amazon in Luxembourg as communicated by the 
European Commission in its letter of September 7, 2014. The European 
Commission claims that tax rulings may constitute an illegal state aid 
according to the Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”), which will be dealt with in detail in this paper.  
                                                 
8
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The paper argues that tax rulings issued to multinational entities providing 
them with tax certainty and predictability that are commonly called (by the 
press) “harmful” tax practices are not the negative phenomenon that is so 
often presented. First, the aim of this paper is to analyze (potentially) 
“harmful” tax practices exercised by multinational entities in the European 
Union that use tax rulings issued by national tax authorities of the member 
states of the European Union and their importance for multinational 
entities` businesses from the international tax point of view. Second, the 
paper will examine the EU rules on state aid and their effect on practice of 
tax rulings and alleged breach of the internal EU market, with a brief 
presentation of the Amazon case in the EU and comparison of the 
investigation and procedure in the United States. Third, the paper will 
address what measures the international community is implementing to 
fight tax avoidance, primarily the European Union, the United States and 
OECD/G20.  
 
II. SOURCES OF EU LAW ON STATE AID 
For more than fifteen years, the European Commission has been 
using the rules on prohibition of state aid as a method to tackle harmful tax 
7
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Primary sources of EU law on state aid are contained in 
Article 107 and 108 of TFEU. The goal of the state aid rules is to ensure 
that member states do not provide selective advantages to certain 
undertakings to the detriment of others.
11 
 
Article 107(1) of TFEU also applies in the field of taxation 
notwithstanding the fact that the competence of the Union to regulate 
direct taxation is limited under the TFEU.
12
 
Art. 107(1) of TFEU prescribes: 
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted 
by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade 





This provision prohibits the provision of advantages, in any form, 
by national public authorities to undertakings on a selective basis.
14
 The 
                                                 
10
 Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6. 
11
 Id. at 101. 
12
 State Aid SA.38944 (2014/C) – Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon by Way of a Tax 
Ruling (herein “Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon”), at 13, COM (2014) 7156 final 
(Oct. 7, 2014). 
13
 EUR-LEX, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, art. 107(1), 2012 O.J. (326). 
14
 Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 94. 
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 have to be satisfied in order to have an illegal 
and prohibited state aid: 
a) Recipients are granted an advantage in a sense that the 
measure relieves them from a liability that they would 
otherwise incur from their budgets; 
b) The advantage is granted by the state or through state 
resources; 
c) Such measure affects (distorts) competition and trade 
between member states; and 
d) The measure is selective in a sense that it favors certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
 
Exceptions to Article 107(1) are contained in Art. 107(2) and (3) of 
TFEU. 
Article 107(2) of TFEU prescribes:  
The following shall be compatible with the internal market:  
a) aid having a social character, granted to individual 
consumers, provided that such aid is granted 
without discrimination related to the origin of the 
products concerned;  
b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural 
disasters or exceptional occurrences;  
c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the 
Federal Republic of Germany affected by the 
division of Germany, in so far as such aid is 
required in order to compensate for the economic 
disadvantages caused by that division. Five years 
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
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Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, 




Article 107(2) of TFEU prescribes exceptions, which are ex lege in 
compliance with the internal market. 
Article 107(3) of TFEU prescribes:  
The following may be considered to be compatible with the 
internal market:  
a) aid to promote the economic development of areas 
where the standard of living is abnormally low or 
where there is serious underemployment, and of the 
regions referred to in Article 349, in view of their 
structural, economic and social situation;  
b) aid to promote the execution of an important project 
of common European interest or to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State;  
c) aid to facilitate the development of certain 
economic activities or of certain economic areas, 
where such aid does not adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest;  
d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation 
where such aid does not affect trading conditions 
and competition in the Union to an extent that is 
contrary to the common interest;  
e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by 
decision of the Council on a proposal from the 
Commission. 
 
Opposed to the ex lege exceptions of Article 107(2) of TFEU, 
exceptions contained under Article 107(3) of TFEU are not ex lege 
                                                 
16
 EUR-LEX, supra note 13. 
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considered to be compliant with internal market. They will only be 
compatible with the internal market after the European Commission, upon 
notification by the member state, gives its authorization. The European 
Commission acts under a system of prior authorization to ensure that 
member states do not implement their measures of state aid before the 
Commission grants an approval. In this way, it ensures that member states 
implement only such measures that help firms produce goods and services 
that would otherwise not be provided in the internal market instead of 
measures that distort competition.
17
 Article 107(1) of TFEU will further be 
briefly explained. 
1. What is aid and in What Forms can it Arise? 
Article 107(1) of TFEU defines state aid as “any aid … in any 
form whatsoever.”18 This means that aid represents an advantage or 
benefit granted to the recipient of the aid favoring or improving its 
financial situation, being it a positive aid, example of positive benefit is a 
direct payment by a member state to the recipient, or negative aid, 
example of negative benefit is an omission of the member state to collect a 
                                                 
17
 Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 96. 
18
 EUR-LEX, supra note 13. 
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tax at “ordinary” statutory rate.19 The European Commission report on 
state aid rules states that “granting a tax concession entails a loss of 
resources for that state in that it forgoes revenue.”20 The European Court 
of Justice has described an aid as embracing “not only positive benefits, 
but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are 
normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without 
therefore being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in 
character and have the same effect.”21 Notice on business taxation issued 
in 1998 notes that an advantage may be provided through a reduction in 
the firm’s tax burden in various ways, including: 
 A reduction in the tax base (such as special deductions, 
special or accelerated depreciation arrangements or the 
entering of reserves on the balance sheet); 
 A total or partial reduction in the amount of tax (such as 
exemption or a tax credit); 





                                                 
19
 Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 103. 
20
 Commission Report on the implementation of the Commission notice on the application 
of the state aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation (herein “2004 
Commission Report”), at 6, COM (2004) 434 final (Feb. 9, 2004). 
21
 Case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke, 
2001 E.C.R. I-8365. 
22
 Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to 
Direct Business Taxation (herein “1998 Commission Report”), at 3 COM (1998) 384 
final (Oct. 12, 1998). 
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So, when can it be concluded that a certain tax arrangement 
constitutes state aid? To determine whether a tax scheme derogating from 
the normal system may constitute state aid, it must be established whether 
the resulting tax burden is lower than that which would have resulted from 
application of member states’ normal taxation method.23 
2. Participation of a Member State 
 
Article 107(1) of TFEU and the European Commission, in its 1998 
notice on business taxation (the “1998 Commission Report”), states that 
an “advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources.”24 
The 1998 Commission Report further states: 
A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State 
resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. This criterion 
also applies to aid granted by regional or local bodies in the 
Member States. Furthermore, State support may be 
provided through tax provisions which have legislative, 
regulatory or administrative form and through the practices 








                                                 
23
 2004 Commission Report, supra note 20. 
24
 EUR-LEX, supra note 13. 
25
 1998 Commission Report, supra note 22, at 4. 
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3. Aid’s Effect on Competition and Trade Between 
Member States 
 
Another condition prescribed by the TFEU states that an aid 
“distorts or threatens to distort competition,”26 so, this criteria also applies 
to a particular tax measure in order to classify it under Article 107(1) of 
TFEU. The 1998 Commission Report clarifies this by stating that measure 
must affect competition and trade between Member States. This criterion 
requires that the beneficiary of the measure exercises an economic activity 
involving trade between member states, regardless of the beneficiary’s 
legal status or means of financing. The mere strengthening of the 
beneficiary’s position compared with that of other firms that are its 
competitors in internal market is enough to conclude that internal market 
is affected. The small amount of aid, the beneficiary’s size or its small 
share of internal market do not lead to a different conclusion.
27
 Non-profit 
organizations and public enterprises may also be caught by Article 107(1) 




                                                 
26




 Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 108. 
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4. A Selective Advantage to an Undertaking 
 
The last factor that needs to be satisfied, according to Article 
107(1) of TFEU, is the selectivity of the measure in question. Article 
107(1) describes the consequence of an aid as “favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods.”29 As noted in the 1998 
Commission Report: 
The selective advantage involved here may derive from an 
exception to the tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory 
or administrative nature or from a discretionary practice on 
the part of the tax authorities. However, the selective nature 
of a measure may be justified by ‘the nature or general 
scheme of the system’. If so, the measure is not considered 





A tax measure that is limited to certain taxpayers or to certain 
categories of taxpayers based on common features and that deviates from 
a member state`s “benchmark” tax system is considered to be selective.32 
In summary, a tax measure constitutes a state aid if it puts a taxpayer in 
                                                 
29
 EU-LEX, supra note 13. 
30
 1998 Commission Report, supra note 22, at 4. 
31
 Article 92(1) is today’s Article 107(1) of TFEU. 
32
 Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 109. 
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more favorable situation as compared to other taxpayers in comparable 
factual and legal circumstances.
33
 
A performance of selectivity test
34
 is helpful in determining 
whether a specific tax measure is selective. The test is consisted of three 
steps: 
1. Determination of a member state`s “common” or “normal” tax 
system; 
2. Determination whether a specific tax measure deviates from 
the “normal” tax system by granting an advantage to the 
beneficiary (taxpayer), as compared to a taxpayer in similar 
factual and legal circumstances; 
3. Justification of the measure by the nature and general scheme 
of the tax system. 
 
If the measure involved passes all three steps, i.e. if the measure 
can be justified and is consistent with the principle of proportionality 
(does not go beyond what is necessary for the fulfilment of its objective), 
it does not fall into the scope of Article 107(1) of TFEU and it is not 
considered a state aid. 
The Court of Justice has confirmed that if the method of taxation 
for intra-group transfers does not comply with the arm’s length principle, 
and leads to a taxable base inferior to the one which would result from a 
                                                 
33
 Id. at 105. 
34
 Id. at 110. 
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correct implementation of that principle, it provides a selective advantage 
to the company concerned.
35
 
5. De Minimis Exception 
 
Commission Regulation (EU) Number 1407/2013 on the 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to de minimis aid prescribes a ceiling below which 
Article 107(1) of TFEU can be considered not to apply. According to this 
Regulation (which applies from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2020)
36
 
the total amount of de minimis aid granted per member state to a single 
undertaking shall not exceed EUR 200,000 over any period of three fiscal 
years.
37
 This rule ensures that any measure within the scope of this 
Regulation can be deemed not to have any effect on trade between 
member states and not to distort or threaten to distort competition. Such 





                                                 
35
 Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon, supra note 12, at 14. 
36
 Commission Regulation 1407/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 352) 1, 8. 
37
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6. Procedural Aspect: Notification of State aid to and 
Decision by the European Commission 
 
The European Commission is the competent authority that decides 
on compatibility of state aid with internal market, and the procedure is 
prescribed by Article 108 of TFEU and Council Regulation (EC) Number 
659/1999.
39
 Its decisions are subject to review by the Court of Justice. The 
state aid control system distinguishes existing aid, introduced before the 
establishment of the EU or a member state’s accession date, and new aid, 
introduced after a member state’s accession date.40 
The provision of Article 108(1) of TFEU for existing aid requires 
“constant review all systems of aid existing” by the European Commission 
and its proposals to the member states “any appropriate measures required 
by the progressive development or by the functioning of the internal 
market.”41 Existing aid is considered to be lawful as long as the European 
Commission does not find it incompatible with the internal market.
42
 
The provision of Article 108(3) of TFEU for new aid requires that 
“the Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to 
                                                 
39
 Commission Regulation 659/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 083) 1. 
40
 Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 120. 
41
 EUR-LEX, supra note 13. 
42
 Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 121. 
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submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid.”43 After a member 
state has notified the European Commission, Article 108(3) of TFEU 
obliges the state not to put its proposed measures into effect until this 
procedure has resulted in a final decision by the European Commission. 
This means that the European Commission has to determine a measure to 
be compatible with the internal market before a member state puts the 




Even if a measure is covered by one of the ex lege exceptions 
contained in Article 107(2) of TFEU, the member states still have an 
obligation to notify the European Commission before they implement the 
measure. 
If a member state does not follow the European Commission`s 
proposed measures, in case of existing aid, or the Commission concludes 
that notified new measure represents a state aid, it will initiate a formal 
investigation procedure in accordance with Article 108(2) of TFEU and 
communicate its decision to a member state in question by letter, please 
                                                 
43
 EUR-LEX, supra note 13. 
44
 1998 Commission Report, supra note 22, at 8. 
19
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see below for review of the letter to Amazon. This procedure ends with a 
final decision by which the European Commission decides on 




III. EUROPEAN EFFORTS IN TACKLING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 
The suggestions within the EU on how to combat harmful tax 
measures go back to the early 1990s. The Ruding Report presented to the 
European Commission in 1992 was the “study of ways of reforming the 
taxation of Community companies in an increasingly unified internal 
market” and it set out a “series of practical recommendations” upon which 
the Commission was to “draw up its own guidelines for company taxation 
policy.”46 This Report concluded that: 
Despite the tax convergence which has occurred over the 
past decade, the Committee considers it unlikely that 
Member States acting independently of each other can 
bring about any significant reduction in the distortions 
affecting the functioning of the internal market. Action 




                                                 
45
 Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 124. 
46
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Further work included adoption of the Code of Conduct for 
Business Taxation by the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers 
(“ECOFIN”) of December 1, 1997. By adopting this Code, the member 
states have obliged themselves to refrain from introducing any new 
harmful tax measures (“standstill”) and amend any laws or practices that 
are deemed to be harmful in respect of the principles of the Code 
(“rollback”). The code covers tax measures (legislative, regulatory and 
administrative), which have, or may have, a significant impact on the 
location of business in the Union.
48
 
Later in 1998, the European Commission published its “Notice on 
Business Taxation of 1998,”49 which deals with the prohibition of state aid 
in detail, and it was followed by the Report on the Commission Notice in 
2004. 
As noted in the introduction to this paper, the European 
Commission has today been using the principles on prohibition of state aid 
to tackle harmful tax competition and has lately initiated significant 
                                                 
48





 1998 Commission Report, supra note 22. 
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procedures “to examine whether decisions by tax authorities in Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg with regard to the corporate income tax to 
be paid by Apple, Starbucks and Fiat Finance and Trade, respectively, 
comply with the EU rules on state aid.”50 
Specifically, the European Commission will examine if the three 
transfer pricing arrangements, validated in the following tax rulings, 
involve state aid to the benefit of the beneficiary companies: 
 The individual rulings issued by the Irish tax 
authorities on the calculation of the taxable profit 
allocated to the Irish branches of Apple Sales 
International and of Apple Operations Europe;  
 The individual ruling issued by the Dutch tax 
authorities on the calculation of the taxable basis in 
the Netherlands for manufacturing activities of 
Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV; 
 The individual ruling issued by the Luxembourg tax 
authorities on the calculation of the taxable basis in 





Additionally, an investigation has been opened with regard to 
corporate taxation of Amazon in Luxembourg, and this will be further 
presented in this paper. 
                                                 
50
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The details of these cases can be found under case numbers: 
SA.38373 (Alleged aid to Apple), SA.38374 (Alleged aid to Starbucks), 
SA.38375 (Alleged aid to FFT), and SA.38944 (Alleged aid to Amazon) at 
the website of the State aid register.
52
 The register contains, among other 
things, information on a member state concerned, aid instrument in 
question, case type, press release, and a letter from the European 
Commission to the member state. The Commission has stated that Fiat and 
Starbucks have received selective tax advantages from Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands, respectively, which are considered illegal under EU state 
aid provisions and has ordered those member states to recover due taxes 
from both multinationals. 
The proposal by the European Commission from March 2015 
concerns amendment of the Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory 
automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation. This proposal 
has so far been identified as one of the strongest towards tax transparency 
because its goal is to ensure “comprehensive and effective administrative 
co-operation between tax administrations by providing for the mandatory 
                                                 
52
 European Commission, State aid Register, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ (last visited June 19, 2017). 
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automatic exchange of information regarding advance cross border rulings 
and advance pricing arrangements.”53 The core of the proposal is the new 
provision of Article 8(a) which sets conditions for automatic exchange of 
information on tax rulings issued or amended by competent authority of a 
member state with other member states’ competent authorities. The 
obligation also “catches” valid rulings issued in the ten-year period before 
the date on which the proposed Directive will take effect.
54
 According to 
the proposal, the exchanged information should be stored in the central 
depository. 
IV. IS THE PRACTICE OF MULTINATIONALS COMPATIBLE WITH 
INTERNAL MARKET – ALLEGED AID TO AMAZON 
 
In its press release published on October 7, 2014, the European 
Commission announced that it “opened an in-depth investigation to 
examine whether the decision by Luxembourg's tax authorities with regard 
to the corporate income tax to be paid by Amazon in Luxembourg comply 
                                                 
53
 European Commission, supra note 2, at 3. 
54
 Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards 
Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, 12 COM (2016) 
25 final (Jan. 28, 2016). 
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with the EU rules on state aid.”55 This procedure was performed according 
to Article 108(2) of TFEU. 
As stated in the letter communicated by the European Commission 
to Luxembourg (the “Letter”), “the Commission requested Luxembourg to 
provide a complete description of the structure of Amazon in 
Luxembourg, to provide for each of its activities in Luxembourg the 
amount of tax due for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, and to provide an 
explanation on how those amounts were determined.”56 The Commission 
also requested all tax rulings addressed to the Amazon Group in 
Luxembourg since 2004 together with transfer pricing report, if any, 
provided by Amazon to the Luxembourg authorities. 
In its reply to the Commission`s request, the Luxembourg 
authorities provided a tax ruling addressed to Amazon dated November 6, 
2003.
57
 The exact matter of concern of the European Commission is 
described in paragraph 7 of the Letter as: 
                                                 
55
 Press Release, European Commission,  State Aid: Commission Investigates Transfer 
Pricing Arrangements on Corporate Taxation of Amazon in Luxembourg (Oct. 7, 2014). 
56
 Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon, supra note 12, at 1-2.  
57
 Id. at 2. 
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A tax ruling which validates a transfer pricing 
arrangement
58
, also referred to as advance pricing 
arrangement (“APA”). APA means an arrangement that 
determines, in advance of intra-group transactions, an 
appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables, 
critical assumptions as to future events) for the 
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions 




Describing a multinational company doing business in many 
different jurisdictions where different tax rates apply, the European 
Commission made the following observation: 
The after tax profit recorded at the corporate group level is 
the sum of the after-tax profits in each country in which it 
is subject to taxation. Therefore, rather than maximise [sic] 
the profit declared in each country, multinational 
corporations have a financial incentive when allocating 
profit to the different companies of the corporate group to 
allocate as much profit as possible to low tax jurisdictions 




The European Commission gives an example that: 
This could be achieved by exaggerating the price of goods 
sold by a subsidiary established in a low tax jurisdiction to 
a subsidiary established in a high tax jurisdiction. In this 
manner, the higher taxed subsidiary would declare higher 
costs and therefore lower profits when compared to market 
                                                 
58
 Id. at 2-3. As defined in par. 8 of the Letter, transfer pricing refers to the prices charged 
for commercial transactions between various parts of the same corporate group, in 
particular, prices set for goods sold or services provided by one subsidiary of a corporate 
group to another subsidiary of that same group. Id. 
59
 Id. at 2. 
60
 Id. at 3. 
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conditions. This excess profit would be recorded in the 
lower tax jurisdiction and taxed at a lower rate than if the 




The question arises why is this observation so important? The 
European Commission clarifies the tax consequences of such an 
“artificial” price by stating: 
If the (manipulated) price of the transaction between 
companies of the same corporate group were taken into 
account for the assessment of the taxable profits in each 
jurisdiction, it would entail an advantage for the firms 
which can artificially allocate profits between associate 
companies in different jurisdictions compared to other 
undertakings. So as to avoid this type of advantage, it is 
necessary to ensure that taxable income is determined in 




What standards or methods are to be applied to associate entities so 
that they abide by market conditions and do not artificially allocate 
profits? Arm’s length principle is an international standard for setting 
commercial conditions between companies of the same corporate group or 
a branch and its parent company and for the allocation of profit. Arm’s 
length standard requires that commercial and financial relations between 
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associated enterprises should not differ from relations, which would be 
made between independent companies.
63
 
The Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations issued by OECD “provide guidance on the 
application of the “arm's length principle” for the valuation, for tax 
purposes, of cross-border transactions between associated enterprises. 
They stress that it is very important to prevent multinationals in artificially 
shifting their income, and to tax them where they exercise their economic 
activities.”64 
A “normal” calculation of taxable profit in the case of an 
independent enterprise is based on the difference of its income and 
expenses. Methods have been developed for determining taxable income 
of associated enterprises for the purpose of preventing them in tax 
avoidance and to achieve a comparable level of taxation, which could have 
been arrived at if they were independent market players.
65
 




 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (herein “OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines”), Abstract (2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm. 
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28
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss1/5
68 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines provide five methods for 
determining that prices in transactions between affiliates are in compliance 
with an arm’s length principle:  
1. The comparable uncontrolled price method; 
2. The cost plus method; 
3. The resale minus method; 
4. The transactional net margin method; and  
5. The transactional profit split method.66 
 
1. The Amazon Group as Beneficiary of the tax Ruling 
 
As stated in paragraph 16 of the Letter, the European Commission 
focused its investigation on a tax ruling concluded on November 6, 2003 
between the Luxembourg tax authorities and the Amazon group, 
consisting of Amazon.com Inc. and its subsidiaries.
67
 Amazon is an online 
retailer and its business also consists of the manufacture and sale of Kindle 
devices. It offers programs that “enable sellers to sell their products on 
Amazon websites and their own branded websites, and to fulfill orders 
through Amazon. Besides that, Amazon generates revenue through other 
marketing and promotional services, such as online advertising and co-




 Id. at 5. 
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branded credit card agreements. Amazon’s worldwide net sales in 2013 
amount to $74,452,000 and a post-tax net profit was $274,000,000.”68 
2. Amazon’s Structure in Luxembourg 
 
Paragraphs 18 – 23 of the Letter describe the structure of Amazon 
group in Luxembourg. It is comprised of several entities: 
1. Amazon EU Société à responsabilité limitée 
(“Amazon EU Sarl”), having a function of the 
“head office of Amazon for Europe and is the 
principal operator of the retail and business services 
offered through Amazon’s European websites. It 
holds other European subsidiaries, owns the 
inventory, earns the profits associated with the 
selling of products to end customers, and bears the 
risk of any loss.”69 
2. Amazon Europe Technologies Holding SCS (“Lux 
SCS”), being “a Luxembourg limited liability 
partnership that holds all the shares in Amazon EU 
Sarl, licenses the Amazon group’s intellectual 
property rights to Amazon EU Sarl to operate the 
European websites in return for a tax deductible 
royalty payment.”70 
3. Amazon Services Europe Sarl, being a “third party 
seller (i.e. marketplace) business.”71 
4. Amazon Media EU Sarl, being a “Amazon’s EU 
digital business (in which MP3s and eBooks are 
sold).”72 






 Id. at 5-6. 
71








The first, third, and fourth companies listed above form a fiscal 
unity in Luxembourg together with entities Amazon Luxembourg Sarl, 
FinLux Sarl and Amazon Payments SCA, with the first listed company 
being the parent of the unity. These entities are liable for corporate income 
tax in Luxembourg.
73 
There are other entities existing in Luxembourg, 
which are subsidiaries of the second company listed above. 
3. Letters by Amazon of October 23 and 31, 2003 and 
Response by Luxembourg of November 6, 2003 
 
In letters from October 23 and 31, 2003, Amazon requested the 
acceptance of the transfer pricing arrangement between Amazon EU Sarl 
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and Lux SCS and the approval of the legal structure of Amazon for 
Luxembourg corporate income tax purposes by the Luxembourg tax 
authorities. Amazon`s requests were approved by the Luxembourg tax 
authorities on November 6, 2003, just several days after the initial 
request.
74
 The letters sent by Amazon described the restructuring plan for 
its European business. Only a part of the plan is important for the purpose 
of this paper, which, among others, describes that:  
 The headquarters is based in Luxembourg,  
 Amazon EU Sarl is the operator of the retail and business 
services offered through Amazon’s European websites 
(operator of European websites and owner of servers 
through which transactions are processed),  
 Lux SCS (a limited liability partnership which holds all 
shares in Amazon EU Sarl) is a transparent entity for tax 
purposes in Luxembourg and its purpose is to be an 
intangibles holding company which licenses IP to Amazon 




The confirmation by the Luxembourg tax authorities in their letter 
of November 6, 2003 in which they accepted the transfer pricing 
arrangement of Amazon is subject of review by the European Commission 
in the context of alleged state aid. 
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4. Transfer Pricing Agreement Between Amazon EU Sarl 
and Lux SCS 
 
According to the Letter, the IP was developed in the United States 
and Lux SCS obtained a right to exploit it. Lux SCS licensed that IP to 
Amazon EU Sarl in return for a tax-deductible royalty payment that was 
approved by the Luxembourg tax authorities. It was agreed that the 
amount of royalty is computed each year and it would be equal to a 
percentage of Amazon EU Sarl`s revenue with regard to its operation of 
the European web sites.
76
 
Due to the fact that Lux SCS is a transparent entity
77
 for tax 
purposes in Luxembourg, the royalties it receives from Amazon EU Sarl 
are not taxed at the entity level in Luxembourg. Instead, this income is, or 
should be, taxed at the level of participants in the entity, that is, at the level 
of the partners in Lux SCS, in their country of residence in the United 
States, to whom the profits of Lux SCS are allocated.
78
 
                                                 
76
 Id. at 10-11. 
77
 Transparent means that an entity does not have a separate tax personality and does not 
get taxed at the level of the entity. Instead, the income should pass through the entity and 
be taxed at the level of participants in the entity. The participants in this case are the 
partners. 
78
 Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon, supra note 12, at 12. 
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Although this income should be taxed at the partners` level in the 
United States, it gets an indefinite deferral until its repatriation to the 
United States. The reason for this lies in different classification of Lux 
SCS between Luxembourg and the United States, transparent in the first 




According to the European Commission statement contained in 
paragraph 40 of the Letter, Amazon also requested a confirmation from 
the Luxembourg tax authorities that the level of activities carried out in 
Luxembourg by Lux SCS and its partners cannot be interpreted as 




5. Did Amazon Receive a Selective Advantage 
 
As stated earlier in this article, one of the prerequisites that needs to be 
fulfilled for determination of state aid according to Article 107(1) of 
TFEU is the selectivity of the measure in question. Only such tax measure 
that puts a taxpayer in a more favorable situation compared to other 
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taxpayers in comparable factual and legal circumstances constitutes a state 
aid. This concern is expressed in paragraph 48 of the Letter and it is 
manifested in possible lowering of Amazon’s tax liability in 
Luxembourg.
81
 The European Commission elaborates in paragraph 48 to 
52 why all other conditions for determination of state aid, as presented 
earlier in this paper, are fulfilled. 
The European Commission expressly stated, “it can also be 
concluded that the ruling gives rise to a loss of State resources. That is 
because any reduction of tax for Amazon results in a loss of tax revenue 
that otherwise would have been available to Luxembourg.”82 For 
determination of the selectivity criterion, the European Commission 
proposed comparison of methods of assessment of the taxable income of 
Amazon: the method approved in the tax ruling with the “ordinary” tax 
method, “based on the difference between profits and losses of an 
undertaking carrying out its activities under normal market conditions.”83  
If Amazon`s calculation is in line with the market conditions, the 
European Commission expects that an arrangement applied to Amazon 
                                                 
81




 Id. at 14. 
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would not differ from the arrangement “that a prudent independent 
operator acting under normal market conditions would have accepted.”84 
On the other side, if the reality shows that Amazon`s taxable base 
is lower because the arm`s length principle was not correctly applied, it 
results in a selective advantage for an entity, i.e. it is the case of prohibited 
state aid.
85
 The European Commission has not had its final word on the 
subject matter and the decision is still expected.  
6. The Response of the Luxembourg Government 
 
In its response to the letter communicated by the European 
Commission to Luxembourg with regard to the alleged aid provided to 
Amazon by way of a tax ruling, Luxembourg denied that the tax ruling in 
question constitutes state aid.
86
 
The explanation provided by the Luxembourg Government in 
support of its claim was that its tax code of 1967 does not give any 
discretion to tax authorities and “consequently not able to give rise to State 
aid unless the law was misapplied, which could, however, be judged solely 
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by an assessment of the national law.”87 The Government added that this 
particular ruling is “in line with the general tax ruling practice of 
multinationals in Luxembourg and with the OECD principles.”88 
Further, in paragraphs 43 and 44 of the Letter, the Government 
stated that an arm’s length royalty was determined based on performed 
analysis of agreements between Amazon and non-related third parties 
which concern substantially the same IP, and the explanation is given why 
the profit split method was applied to analyze the functions and risks of 
Amazon EU Sarl and Lux SCS.
89
 
7. Provisions of Luxembourg tax law that Were the Basis 
for the Amazon Ruling 
 
Apparently, there was no official legislation in Luxembourg based 
on which Amazon and tax rulings that concern other companies were 
issued. Rather, it was a mere administrative practice to issue such rulings. 
In December 2014, the Luxembourg parliament introduced amendments to 
its national tax law, among which was a new provision that concerns the 
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tax ruling practice, with its date of coming into force on January 1, 2015.
90
 
This means that the current advanced ruling practice, which was based on 
internal instruction issued in 1989 by the head of Luxembourg tax 
authorities, gets modernized with its official basis in the national law.
91
 




8. Amendments to the Luxembourg law with Regard to tax 
Rulings 
 
This subchapter presents the French wording of the newly 
introduced Paragraph 29a of the General Tax Act of Luxembourg, which 
concerns issuance of tax rulings. This provision codifies the existing 
practice of issuance of advance tax rulings. A provisional English 
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 Luxembourg Introduces Legal Framework for Tax Rulings and Updates Transfer 








 Newsletter Du 27 Octobre 2014, LE GOUVERNEMENT DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE 
LUXEMBOURG (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/fr/archive/newsletter/2014/nl_27102014.html; Id.  
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Chapitre 4 - Modification de la loi 
générale des impôts modifiée du 22 
mai 1931 («Abgabenordnung») 
Chapter 4 - Amendment to the 
general tax law modified on May 
22, 1931 ("Abgabenordnung") 
Art. 8. La loi générale des impôts 
modifiée du 22 mai 1931 
(«Abgabenordnung») est modifiée 
et complétée comme suit: 
Art. 8 The general tax law modified 
on May 22, 1931 
("Abgabenordnung") is amended 
and completed as follows: 
1° Il est inséré un paragraphe 29a, 
libellé comme suit: 
1. A paragraph 29a is inserted, to 
read as follows: 
«(1) Sur demande écrite et motivée, 
le préposé du bureau d’imposition 
émet une décision anticipée relative 
à l’application de la loi fiscale à 
une ou plusieurs opérations 
précises envisagées par le 
contribuable ayant pour effet de lier 
le bureau d’imposition à l’occasion 
de l’imposition à effectuer 
ultérieurement. 
"(1) Upon written and 
motivated request, the tax inspector 
of the tax office in charge issues a 
binding advanced tax agreement 
related to the application of the tax 
law in one or more specific 
transactions contemplated by the 
taxpayer. 
 
(2) La décision anticipée permet 
d’offrir au contribuable par 
l’interprétation uniforme et 
égalitaire de la loi fiscale une 
sécurité juridique par rapport au 
traitement fiscal d’une ou de 
plusieurs opérations projetées. 
(2) Through a uniform and fair 
interpretation of tax law, the 
advance tax agreement offers legal 
certainty to the taxpayer with 
respect to the taxable treatment of 
one or more contemplated 
transactions. 
(3) Un règlement grand-ducal 
détermine la procédure applicable 
aux décisions anticipées.” 
(3) A Grand-Ducal Regulation sets 
forth the procedure for advanced 
tax agreement.” 
2° Le paragraphe 171 est complété 
par un alinéa 3, libellé comme suit: 
2. Paragraph 171 is completed by a 
paragraph 3, to read as follows: 
«(3) Les dispositions des alinéas 1 
et 2 s’appliquent de manière 
correspondante aux transactions 
entre entreprises associées.» 
"(3) The provisions of paragraphs 1 
and 2 shall apply correspondingly 
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V. IS IT REALLY A SELECTIVE TAX TREATMENT? 
The European Commission is currently investigating whether the 
tax ruling provided to Amazon by Luxembourg tax authorities is in 
compliance with the arm`s length principle. Its concerns are with regard to 
the following: 
1. Failure of Luxembourg to submit a transfer pricing report 
(analysis) prepared by Amazon in support of the transfer 
pricing arrangement in the ruling request, although it seems 
that such document might exist;
94
 
2. Assessment of the Amazon`s ruling request within (only) 
eleven working days from the receipt of the first letter 
(which is a very short period of time had a transfer pricing 
report been submitted and assessed);
95
 
3. Appropriateness of transfer pricing method proposed by 




4. Presentation of royalty payments by Amazon EU Sarl to 
Lux SCS in the form of a royalty rate over revenue and not 
really calculated in that way, but instead it is calculated as a 
residual profit. Rather than being expressed as a percentage 




5. Deviation from the OECD transfer pricing and no 
justification for the use of indirect method for an arm’s 
                                                 
94
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length remuneration due to Amazon EU Sarl, while there 
was a possibility to use a direct method, which is also 
preferred by the European Commission. In addition, the 
level of remuneration seems low;
98
 and 
6. The tax ruling is more than 10 years old, and has been 
applied to Amazon without amendment, which would take 




After taking all these concerns into account, the Commission 
believed that the Amazon ruling is contrary to the arm’s length principle 
and that the Luxembourg tax authorities provide an on-going selective 
advantage to Amazon by agreeing on its tax liability.
100
 The Commission 
believed that all conditions for determination of state aid are fulfilled 
which is considered contrary to the EU law and might be found 
incompatible with the internal market. 
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL AID 
 
The European Commission has broad powers in preserving the 
European internal market. Its actions in dealing with illegal aid depend on 
whether the aid already exists or represents a newly granted aid. If the 
European Commission finds an existing aid to be incompatible with 
                                                 
98
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internal market, it can propose appropriate measures to the member state 
concerned with a view to removing the distortion of competition caused 




The recovery of the new aid can be requested if measure that 
constitutes it is implemented before receiving prior authorization from the 
European Commission. Such aid is unlawful aid and it will have to be 
recovered if it is determined to be incompatible with internal market.
102
 
Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 provides that all 
unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient of such aid. 
The Notice on business taxation of 1998 explains the calculation of 
the amount to be recovered in case of state aid in form of tax measures: 
comparison is made between the tax actually paid and the amount which 
should have been paid if the generally applicable rule had been applied, 
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VII. INVESTIGATIONS IN THE U.S. AND HOW SHOULD THE U.S. ATTACK 
ABUSIVE TAX PRACTICES  
 
The European Union is not the only jurisdiction where the relevant 
authorities “fight” multinational entities that shift their profits to those 
member states where tax rates are lower, such as Luxembourg or Ireland, 
with the goal of cutting their tax bills. Amazon’s transfer pricing dispute104 
(to name just one example) with the tax authorities in the United States 
(Internal Revenue Service) before the U.S. Tax Court shows that tax 
avoidance is a global phenomenon, which goes beyond the borders of the 
European Union. 
Joint Committee on Taxation, a body of the United States 
Congress, prepared a publication, “Present Law And Background Related 
To Possible Income Shifting And Transfer Pricing,” which it submitted to 
the House Committee On Ways And Means on July 22, 2010. In this 
document, the Joint Committee on Taxation presented six cases (described 
on an anonymous basis) of U.S. based multinational corporations that had 
an effective (i.e. average) tax rate on worldwide income of less than 25% 
                                                 
104
 Amazon.Com, Inc. & Subsidiaries V. Comm’r Of Internal Revenue, Docket No. 
031197-12 (T.C. 2014), 
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during at least one multi-year period since 1999.
105
 The goal of the case 
study was to “identify business structures that facilitate possible income 
shifting or deficiencies in the application of transfer-pricing rules.”106 This 
publication states, in the overview of the U.S. tax system, that: 
The United States employs a worldwide tax system under 
which U.S. resident individuals and domestic corporations 
generally are taxed on all income, whether derived in the 
United States or abroad; the foreign tax credit provides 
relief from double taxation. Income earned in the United 
States directly or through a pass-through entity (such as a 
branch) is taxed on a current basis. By contrast, active 
foreign business earnings that a U.S. person derives 
indirectly through a foreign corporation generally are not 
subject to U.S. tax until such earnings are repatriated to the 





The publication further notes that the principal tax policy concern 
is that “profits may be artificially inflated in low-tax countries and 
depressed in high-tax countries through aggressive transfer pricing that 
does not reflect an arm’s length result from a related-party transaction and 
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 J. Comm.on Tax’n, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME 
SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING 1 (Comm. Print 2010). 
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that there is “empirical evidence that U.S. multinational corporations shift 
income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions.”108 
Examples of corporations such as Amazon and others that are 
“rich” with intellectual property (“IP”) show that a reduction in the U.S. 
tax base is accomplished by moving the IP rights into a low tax 
jurisdiction. The above quoted publication describes two possibilities for 
accomplishing this goal: either by having a “foreign affiliate enter into an 
agreement with the U.S. group to buy in to the pre-existing foreign or 
worldwide territorial rights to exploit the intellectual property rights 
attributable to certain product lines and share the cost of future 
development of those intellectual property rights” or by having the 
“foreign affiliate enter into a license agreement with the U.S. group to 
make and sell certain product lines either solely in non-U.S. territories or 
worldwide.”109 
The publication concludes that all companies presented in the case 
study have the following common characteristics: 
 Concentration of more profitable functions in foreign 
jurisdictions where the average tax rate is lower and a 
                                                 
108
 Id. at 4, 5. 
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concentration of their less profitable functions in 
jurisdictions where the average tax rate is higher; 
 Exploitation of intangible property rights effectively as part 
of foreign operations (as stated above, either through buy-
in and cost-sharing arrangements, or through licensing 
agreements); 
 Deferral of a substantial percentage of foreign earnings by 
effectively managing exposure to the subpart F rules 
(check-the-box rules
110







According to the case study, these companies are successful in 
concentrating their income in jurisdictions with low tax rates, statutorily 
prescribed or negotiated with local authorities, in lowering their 
worldwide tax rates and increasing their after-tax earnings.
113
 
Various solutions have been suggested in the United States to 
better tax worldwide income of its multinationals. For example, the U.S. 
President in the Fiscal Year 2016 and 2017 Budgets of the U.S. 
                                                 
110
 CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 
MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 1082 (4
th
 ed. 2011). “Check-the-box regulations 
permit the organization to elect to be treated for U.S. tax purposes either as a corporation 
or as a conduit, flow-through or fiscally transparent entity (i.e. in effect, as a partnership 
or if it has only one member, as a disregarded entity or branch). The election is available 
to any business entity organized under foreign law except the foreign law counterpart of a 
U.S. corporation, which is required, even under the check-the-box regulations, to be 
treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes.” Id.  
111
 Id. at 911.“If a controlled foreign corporation manufactures goods in its country of 
incorporation, the income it generates by their sale cannot be foreign base company sales 
income.” Id.  
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Government proposed a reform of the U.S. international tax system, which 
would include the following: 
1. Introducing a 19% minimum tax on foreign 
earnings that would require U.S. companies to pay 
tax on all of their foreign earnings when earned 
(without opportunities for deferral), after which 
earnings could be reinvested in the United States 
without additional tax; 
2. Preventing U.S. companies from avoiding tax 
through “inversions” (transactions in which U.S. 
companies buy smaller foreign companies, then 
reorganize the combined firm to reduce U.S. tax 
liability);  
3. Preventing foreign companies operating in the U.S. 
from using excessive interest deductions to “strip” 
earnings out of the U.S. and avoid U.S. tax;
114
 
4. Limiting shifting of income through intangible 
property transfers; 
5. Restricting the use of hybrid arrangements that 
create stateless income; and 





Proposals from prior budgets included: 
1. Taxing excess returns on intangibles: treating excess 
returns in a low tax country on intangibles 
transferred to it from the United States as Subpart F 
income (current taxation) and in a separate foreign 
tax credit basket (to prevent other foreign taxes to 
offset U.S. taxes due on the excess returns); 
                                                 
114
 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 
57 (2015). 
115
 Id. at 125-26. 
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2. Clarifying rules that concern transfer pricing of 
intangibles: intangibles would include workforce in 
place, goodwill, and going concern value. IRS would 
be able to aggregate intangibles if that leads to a 
more appropriate value. The best value of intangibles 
would be by a willing buyer and seller with 




VIII. OECD: BEPS PROJECT AND THE STATELESS INCOME PROBLEM  
 
The European Union and the United States participate in an 
internationally coordinated and worldwide approach to tackle double non-
taxation and the artificial shifting of profits, known as the BEPS Project. 
The BEPS Project is developed under the leadership of OECD, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
BEPS stands for “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” and refers to 
“tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to 
make profits ‘disappear’ for tax purposes or to shift profits to locations 
where there is little or no real activity but the taxes are low, resulting in 
little or no overall corporate tax being paid.”117 
OECD explains that BEPS is caused when “activities cross border, 
the interaction of domestic tax systems means that an item of income can 
                                                 
116
 Gravelle, supra note 1, at 46.  
117
 OECD, BEPS – Frequently Asked Questions, OECD.ORG, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm (last visited June 19, 2017). 
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be taxed by more than one jurisdiction, thus resulting in double taxation. 
The interaction can also leave gaps, which result in income not being 
taxed anywhere. BEPS strategies take advantage of these gaps between tax 
systems in order to achieve double non-taxation.”118 Therefore, BEPS 
does not necessarily deal with illegal tax avoidance strategies, but with 
strategies that are legal within tax regimes implemented by governments 
of different countries among which there are discrepancies in tax rules. 
Those who use BEPS strategies use these differences to cut their tax bills. 
The wider international community has been concerned about 
BEPS because it provides certain taxpayers a “competitive advantage over 
enterprises that operate at the domestic level”119 with the result of 
distortion of competition. BEPS Project is a worldwide approach, 
including not only the most developed countries in the world, but also 
non-G20/non-OECD members that are also concerned about this issue and 
are actively participating in the project. BEPS consists of 15 action 
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 that aim to bring profound amendments to the international tax 
rules. These action plans are the following: 
 Action 1 - The digital economy  
 Action 2 – Hybrid mismatch arrangements  
 Action 3 – Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) regimes  
 Action 4 – Financial payments  
 Action 5 – Harmful tax practices  
 Action 6 – Treaty abuse  
 Action 7 – Permanent establishment (PE) status 
 Action 8 – Transfer pricing and intangibles  
 Action 9 – Transfer pricing and risks/capital  
 Action 10 – Transfer pricing and other high-risk 
transactions  
 Action 11 – Data and methodologies  
 Action 12 – Disclosure of aggressive tax planning 
 Action 13 – Transfer pricing documentation  
 Action 14 – Dispute resolution mechanisms  
 Action 15 – A multilateral instrument  
 
The ultimate goal of this project is to enable countries to impose 
taxation on income in those jurisdictions where multinationals exercise 
economic activity and to prevent possibilities for allocating income to 
places with no nexus to such activity, through harmonization of 
international taxation rules. If this project achieves its desired goals, it 
may mean an end to the artificial shifting of income and double non-
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taxation. In the end, it will result in restoring and strengthening taxing 
rights of sovereign countries around the world.
121
 
As these measures, which are mere recommendations by OECD, 
will not become directly applicable for all participants in the BEPS 
Project, OECD stated that they will have to be introduced through 
domestic laws, bilateral tax treaties, or a multilateral convention that 
would amend the network of existing bilateral tax treaties at one time.
122
 
IX. COMMISSION’S JUNE 2015 ACTION PLAN FOR FAIR AND EFFICIENT 
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM – REINTRODUCING CCCTB 
The European Commission presented its “Action Plan for Fair and 
Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union” on June 17, 2015 
(the “Action Plan”).123 The Action Plan represents a proposal for 
fundamental reform of corporate taxation system within the EU that 
currently provides opportunities for multinational companies to engage in 
complex tax strategies with a goal of avoiding taxes. The Commission 
believes that if the member states were to cooperate more closely and 
together through the Action Plan they would develop “fair, efficient and 






 Communication from the Commission to The European Parliament and the Council 
(herein “Action Plan”), COM (2015) 302 final (June 17, 2015). 
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more growth-friendly”124 corporate tax environment. The Commission 
proposes five elements
125
 for the major upgrade of corporate tax structure, 
as follows: 
1. Re-launching the Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (“CCCTB”), by introduction of one set of rules 
for calculation of companies’ profits for all their activities 
in the EU, in lieu of various national rules that currently 
apply. The biggest advantage of this system would be a 
consolidation that would allow “offsetting losses in one 
member state against profits in another.”126 The CCCTB 
would be mandatory for all member states. It is expected 
that it would be “highly effective in tackling profit shifting 
and corporate tax abuse”127 and result in (administratively) 
simpler and cheaper environment for companies doing 
business in the EU. 
2. Ensuring effective taxation where profits are 
generated, by introduction of various measures that will 
secure effective taxation in the EU of companies doing 
business in the EU and measures for improving the transfer 
pricing system. The Commission has plans for adjusting the 
definition of permanent establishment, amending the 
controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) rules, and updating 
the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, Interest and 
Royalties Directive and Parent Subsidiary Directive. 
3. Creating a better business environment, by 
removing tax obstacles for EU businesses and simplifying 
and attracting businesses to operate in the EU. The 
Commission has in mind introduction of the CCCTB and 
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new mechanisms for resolving double tax disputes and 
allowing cross-border loss offsetting. This would result in a 
level playing field for all companies, from small start-ups 
to multinationals. 
4. Increasing transparency, by publishing first pan-EU 
list
128
 of tax havens (“third-country non-cooperative 
jurisdictions”) and opening an online public consultation129 
on tax transparency and public disclosure of corporate tax 
information by companies, which is a continuation of Tax 
Transparency Package
130
 introduced in March 2015 that 
proposed an automatic exchange of information on cross-
border tax rulings. 
5. Improving EU coordination on corporate tax 
matters, by introduction of joint audits that would allow tax 
authorities of different member states to jointly audit a 
multinational company. 
 
A major difference between OECD’s BEPS project, which is 
actively supported by the EU, and the Action Plan is the latter’s 
mandatory nature. As stated earlier, BEPS represents a set of legally non-
binding recommendations, which needs to be implemented through 
bilateral or multilateral tax treaties. On the other side, the European 
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 Tax Good Governance in the World as Seen by EU Countries, EUROPEAN COMM’N 
(2016), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/tax-good-
governance/tax-good-governance-world-seen-eu-countries_en (last visited June 19, 
2017). 
129
 Public Consultation on Further Corporate tax Transparency, EUROPEAN COMM’N 
(2015), http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/further-corporate-tax-
transparency/index_en.htm (last visited June 19, 2017). 
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 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
tax Transparency to Fight tax Evasion and Avoidance, EUROPEAN COMM’N (2015), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0136 (last 
visited June 19, 2017). 
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Commission proposes mandatory, legally binding solutions for EU-28 
through the Action Plan. The Commission expressly confirmed that it has 
“no intention” to harmonize corporate tax rates because it is “Member 
States’ sovereign right to decide their statutory tax rates.”131 Adoption of 
these measures could deliver the necessary framework for fair and 
efficient corporate taxation system in the EU, with clear and transparent 
rules that would make it difficult or impossible for multinational 
companies to engage in aggressive tax planning to artificially reduce their 
tax debts and result in fair distribution of tax revenues among the member 
states. 
 
X. EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL FOR ANTI-TAX AVOIDANCE 
DIRECTIVE  
 
In early 2016, the European Commission announced its anti-tax-
avoidance package that, among others, includes a draft anti-tax-avoidance 
directive. The Commission explained the policy behind the package as 
“competitive disadvantage suffered by businesses that do not engage in 
aggressive tax planning” compared to those that do and “significant 
                                                 
131
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revenue loss” by the member states.132 The draft directive suggests 
implementation of some BEPS-presented measures as minimum standards 
to the EU member states to provide better protection to the corporate tax 
bases. Some of the key suggestions
133
 of the draft directive are: 
 Introduction of the General Anti-Abuse Rule (“GAAR”) – 
The tax authorities’ tool to disallow transactions with the 
main purpose of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the 
purpose of the provision or rule. 
 Hybrid entities mismatch rules – These encompass rules 
that deal with mismatches between EU member states as a 
result of hybrid entities or instruments. Hybrid entities or 
instruments provide tax advantages for multinational 
groups resulting from differences in the tax treatment of an 
entity or instrument between different jurisdictions. 
 Introduction of the controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) 
rules for entities subject to a low level of taxation and 
where a certain percentage of the entities income is passive 
(usually more than 50%). 
 
Taking into account the complex enactment procedure, before the 
European Parliament and the Council, it is predicted that the directive 
might take effect in 2017. 
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XI. CONCLUSION 
The international community has become aware that sovereign 
governments are losing millions of dollars and euros because of 
multinational entities that shift their profits from jurisdictions with high 
tax rates to low tax jurisdictions. There is no exact number on the total 
loss that governments suffer each year, but some estimates suggest that it 
amounts to more than $100 billion per year. The main reason for loss of 
revenues are not illegal activities of multinationals known as tax evasion, 
but tax avoidance which represent activities of multinational entities using 
“loopholes” and discrepancies between tax regimes implemented by 
different governments around the world. The right to taxation is the 
prerogative of sovereign governments that do not succeed in exercising 
that right in full because profits are moved away from jurisdictions in 
which the economic activity occurs. It needs to be stressed that 
multinational entities are led by their legitimate business reasons when 
trying to lower their taxes. In doing so, they are using channels (i.e. 
bilateral tax treaties) set up in legitimate procedures by sovereign 
governments around the world. 
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The procedures that undergo several phases of bilateral 
negotiations between the governments, local parliamentary procedures that 
include, usually, majority votes in parliaments and ratification processes. 
Once bilateral treaties enter into force, they are to be used by businesses 
that operate in cross-border environments. For people outside of the 
business world it might be hard to understand that multinationals, while 
wisely yet cautiously using legal gaps, are still fully complying with 
bilateral tax treaties that have been negotiated and put into force by their 
respective governments. 
In addition, many countries have contributed to the problem by 
their reluctance to the implementation of principles of transparency, 
reporting of income and exchange of information, for the purpose of 
keeping their bank secrecy and similar non-transparent rules in 
application. In such an environment, the most common methods used by 
multinationals for shifting their income from high to low tax jurisdictions 
are transfers of intangibles (intellectual property), allocation of debt, and 
using hybrid entities, to name just a few. One of the reports issued by the 
U.S. Congress identified some major jurisdictions as tax havens, among 
which are the Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, the UK, and three states 
57
Krmek: EU Tax Probe
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
97 
in the United States, Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming. Many other less 
developed countries around the world have room to tighten their tax anti-
abuse rules as well. 
In order to prevent further erosion of tax bases, OECD has invited 
governments to act collectively, rather than on an individual basis. The 
theoretical and political idea is that the tax laws need to be changed in a 
way to achieve complete harmonization between tax regimes of different 
countries. Various individual suggestions have been made from 
introducing anti-abuse legislation or restricting foreign tax credits from 
offsetting taxes owed to own country, but no proposal yet has been so 
broad and thorough to amend international tax rules as the OECD’s 
project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”). 
Although this project involves the most developed nations in the 
world, as well as many developing countries not members of OECD, the 
real question is whether such a complex international alliance can truly 
combat harmful tax practices. In theory, the outcome of the BEPS project 
should be a broad and harmonized implementation of standards that 
prevent double taxation together with standards designed to avoid double 
non-taxation. However, whether the current 96 members of the BEPS 
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project can unanimously adopt its recommendations without any 
reservations will eventually be an indicator of success. 
Taking into consideration that there are a few thousand bilateral 
tax treaties currently in effect which took years to negotiate and become 
enforceable, and that BEPS Action 15 suggests a multilateral instrument to 
implement tax-treaty BEPS related measures in all those treaties, the 
author of this article does not believe in the broad success of the BEPS 
project. It is not only the size of the project that is troubling, but also the 
fact that some countries may only adopt those measures that fit them best.  
For example, the European Commission is a long-standing supporter of 
the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (“CCCTB”) project. This 
project involves only EU member states and should enable companies that 
operate in more than one EU member state to file a single tax return 
through one tax administration for all their EU activities. In addition, it 
would enable them to offset losses they have in one member state against 
profits in another member state. Its positive effects would manifest in 
greater transparency, simplification, reduction of compliance costs and 
closing loopholes between member states’ tax systems. Although this 
project has been developing for over a decade and it involves only 28 
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countries (i.e. EU member states), unfortunately it has not achieved any 
significant results yet. 
The tax investigations performed by the European Commission 
have shown that some multinational entities have paid too low corporate 
income tax in particular EU member states. Specifically, the Commission 
has stated that Fiat and Starbucks have received selective tax advantages 
from Luxembourg and the Netherlands, respectively, which are considered 
illegal under EU state aid provisions and has ordered those member states 
to recover due taxes from both multinationals. The Commission suspects 
that those companies have received illegal state aid by respective 
governments implemented through issuance of advance tax rulings 
providing legal certainty by “blessing” their corporate structures and 
planned intra-group transactions. The Court of Justice will make the final 
decision in both cases several years from now. In case the Court of Justice 
confirms the Commission’s findings that the governments have not taken 
into account regular market conditions and the arm’s length principle 
when issuing advanced rulings, the consequences should include: the 
repayment of aid received, increased for the amount of interests and 
penalties, and public disclosure of financial information (as far as bank 
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and tax secrecy rules allow). On the other side, if the Court of Justice does 
not agree with Commission’s conclusions and rules in favor of 
multinationals, there will already be some irreversible accompanying 
consequences for such multinationals in terms of negative publicity and 
damaged public image, potential loss of customers, and profit. 
Amazon is still waiting for the outcome of the Commission’s 
investigation. The European Commission preliminarily believes that the 
tax ruling granted by Luxembourg resulted in a reduction of charges that 
should have been borne by Amazon and, therefore, constitutes state aid. It 
has not yet been decided whether that ruling is compatible with the EU 
internal market or not. Although Luxembourg and the Netherlands have 
been ordered to collect due taxes from Fiat and Starbucks respectively, the 
decisions in those cases should not prejudice the outcome of the Amazon 
investigation in the EU. Amazon has also been confronted with serious 
and expensive procedure against the Internal Revenue Service before the 
U.S. Tax Court, the outcome of which is still unpredicted; most part of the 
trial has been closed to the public. Due to the fact that Amazon has been 
involved in two major tax procedures (in the U.S. and in the EU), the 
possible negative outcome of those procedures might be very burdensome 
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for the company. It might result in reduced volume of business activity, 
dismissal of employees, and company’s withdrawal from certain markets. 
The case before the U.S. Tax Court might end in settlement with the IRS. 
The European Commission’s decision will not be final for Amazon, since 
it is subject to review by the Court of Justice that can either confirm the 
Commission’s findings or rule in favor of Amazon. 
The United States has put political pressure on the European 
Commission stating that the EU is disproportionately targeting U.S. 
companies and that “EU state aid probe violates the rule of law” by its 
retroactive effect that is “improper and plainly undermines legal 
certainty.”134 The United States has made it clear that it would “ensure that 
the U.S. is using all of the tools at its disposal to protect U.S. interests.”135 
One of the tools at the U.S.’ disposal is enforcing the Internal Revenue 
Code Section 891 “Doubling of rates of tax on citizens and corporations of 
certain foreign countries.”136 If Section 891 were invoked against the EU, 
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 Internal Revenue Code Section 891 reads: “Whenever the President finds that, under 
the laws of any foreign country, citizens or corporations of the United States are being 
subjected to discriminatory or extraterritorial taxes, the President shall so proclaim and 
the rates of tax imposed by sections 1, 3, 11, 801, 831, 852, 871, and 881 shall, for the 
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it would “double the tax rate on income earned at U.S. subsidiaries of 
European companies.”137 Specifically, enforcement of this section would 
mean that a U.S. domestic 30% tax rate would apply on certain types of 
income of EU corporations doubled by the application of Section 891. For 
U.S. source could become taxable by 60% tax rate, where Croatia does not 
have a double tax treaty with the United States that could provide a relief. 
Such an economic warfare between the United States and the EU might 
put pressure on the European Commission to end tax investigations 
against U.S. multinationals. 
Differences between corporate tax regimes influence choices of 
multinational entities’ location and investments. Multinational businesses 
that operate in cross-border environments have legitimate business reasons 
                                                                                                                         
taxable year during which such proclamation is made and for each taxable year thereafter, 
be doubled in the case of each citizen and corporation of such foreign country; but the tax 
at such doubled rate shall be considered as imposed by such sections as the case may be. 
In no case shall this section operate to increase the taxes imposed by such sections 
(computed without regard to this section) to an amount in excess of 80[%] of the taxable 
income of the taxpayer (computed without regard to the deductions allowable under 
section 151 and under part VIII of subchapter B). Whenever the President finds that the 
laws of any foreign country with respect to which the President has made a proclamation 
under the preceding provisions of this section have been modified so that discriminatory 
and extraterritorial taxes applicable to citizens and corporations of the United States have 
been removed, he shall so proclaim, and the provisions of this section providing for 
doubled rates of tax shall not apply to any citizen or corporation of such foreign country 
with respect to any taxable year beginning after such proclamation is made.” I.R.C. § 891 
(2015). 
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to concentrate their activities where the cost of doing business is the 
lowest. In doing so they are using bilateral tax treaties entered into 
between their sovereign governments. Their activities can result in erosion 
of tax bases and a loss of tax revenue for tax authorities. However, these 
“harmful” tax practices, as they are commonly called in the press, have 
been enabled by the governments, and not by the multinationals. 
Multinationals should not be in the spotlight for using the means (i.e. tax 
treaties) that were provided to them by their sovereign governments. 
Governments have become aware of this phenomenon and are trying to 
prevent further erosion of tax bases by harmonizing their tax regimes and 
tightening anti-abuse rules through projects such as BEPS and CCCTB. It 
is uncertain whether these projects will succeed because countries can 
selectively adopt only those measures that suit them best which would 
inevitably contribute to even more complexity in an already complex 
world of international tax. 
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